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Abstract 
Credit risk management in Italy is characterized, in the period June 2008 – June 2012, by frequent 
(frequency=0.5 cycles/year) and intense (peak amplitude: mean=39.2 b€; s.e.=2.83 b€) quarterly 
contractions and expansions around the mean (915.4 b€; s.e.=3.59 b€) of the nominal total credit used 
by non-financial corporations. Such frequent and intense fluctuations are frequently ascribed to 
exogenous Basel II procyclical effects on credit flow into the economy and, consequently, Basel III 
output-based point-in-time Credit/GDP countercyclical buffering advocated. We have tested the 
opposite null hypotheses that such variation is significantly correlated to actual default rates, and that 
such correlation is explained by fluctuations of credit supply around a steady state. We have found 
that, in the period June 2008 – June 2012 (n=17), linear regression of credit growth rates on default 
rates reveals a negative correlation of r=−.6903 with R2=.4765, and that credit supply fluctuates 
steadily around the default rate with an Internal Steady State Parameter SSP=.00245 with 𝛘2=37.47 
(v=16, P<.005). We conclude that fluctuations of the total credit used by non-financial corporations are 
exhaustively explained by variation of the independent variable “default rate”, and that credit variation 
fluctuates around a steady state. We conclude that credit risk management in Italy has been effective in 
parameterizing credit supply variation to default rates within the Basel II operating framework. Basel 
III prospective countercyclical point-in-time output buffers based on filtered Credit/GDP ratios and 
dynamic provisioning proposals should take into account this underlying steady state statistical pattern.  
Keywords 
Frequent cyclical fluctuations, Credit growth rate, Default rate, Retrospective Forecasting, Steady 
State Function, Steady State Parameter  
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1. Background 
Credit risk management has become one of the most relevant topics both for financial institutions 
and for scholars. Credit risk models have evolved from subjective analysis to accounting-based credit-
scoring systems and measures of credit risk and risk concentration (Altman and Saunders, 1998) and 
their effects on capital allocation and shareholders’ value in banking assessed (Resti and Sironi 2012).  
The European Commission with the Credit Risk Directives (CRD I, II and III) and Banking 
Authorities with Basel Accords on minimum capital requirements and countercyclical buffers (Basel II 
and III) are still carrying out a long process of formalization of credit risk management methods and 
guidelines in order to diffuse a culture of common rules at the continental level. 
Monitoring, data collecting and analysis of economic and financial cyclicality is coordinated in the 
EU by Eurostat, with cyclical indicators1 such as the Business Climate Indicator (BCI), the OECD 
Composite Leading Indicators (CLI), the Ifo Economic Climate Indicator, the DZ Euroland, the IARC, 
IESR and E-Coin published quarterly by Eurostatistics. 
Eurostat has developed and implemented a set of guidelines for the statistical analysis of cyclical 
fluctuations (2003) and modern statistical tools (Sigma 2009) to which we will refer in full2. 
As far as banks’ regulatory capital is concerned, procyclicality, and the potential effects of capital 
requirements standards on the flow of credit into the economy, have been addressed by the Basel II 
Committee and Italy’s Central Bank (Banca d’Italia)3 which recommended to use long term data 
horizons to estimate probabilities of default (PD)4, to introduce a downturn loss-given-default (LGD) 
estimate5 and to introduce expected long-run loss rates (EL) in AIRB methods6. Basel II accords 
require own estimates of PD and LGD to be no less than the long-run default-weighted average loss 
rate given default calculated based on the average economic loss of all observed defaults within the 
data source for that type of facility7. Coherently, the introduction of point-in-time output buffers based 
on a Hodrick-Prescott filter of the macroeconomic Credit-to-GDP gap8 to reduce procyclicality during 
                                                
1 Eurostatistics 12/2012: 9-14 
2 Eurostat (2003); 3.2 
3 Banca d’Italia (2006), Nuove disposizioni di vigilanza prudenziale per le banche - Circolare n. 263 del 27 dicembre 2006 
4 See BCBS 2006, sub-sections 472,  502, 503, 504. 
5 See BCBS 2006, sub-section 468 
6 See BCBS 2006, sub-section 367 and Table 6 page 236  
7 See BCBS 2006, sub-section 468 
8 See BCBS 2010a, pages 8-14 
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periods of excessive credit growth and promote countercyclical dampening during periods of 
contraction is among the main goals of the ongoing Basel III reform9.  
Specifically, Italy is characterized by the enduring effects of the 2007-09 financial crisis in terms 
of actual and prospective negative GDP growth (-2.4% in 2012; -0.2% in 2013), growing sovereign 
Debt (≅2,000 b€) and a growing Debt/GDP ratio (≅1.25) ratio10 In the period June 2008 – June 2012, 
the volume of outstanding loan facilities is characterized by frequent (frequency=0.5 cycles/year) and 
intense (peak amplitude: mean=39.2 b€; s.e.=2.83 b€) quarterly cyclical fluctuations11 in the minima 
to maxima12 interval around the mean (915.4 b€; s.e.=3.59 b€) of the nominal total credit used by 
non-financial corporations13. 
The conflicting effects of cyclicality on the tradeoff between stability and timeliness in predicting 
probabilities of default and recovery rates have been analyzed by Altman, Brady, Sironi and Resti 
(2005), who observe that banks tend to react to short-term evidence therefore regulation should 
encourage the use of long-term average rates in AIRB systems. In Italy linear long-term predictions 
due to the frequent cyclical waveform fluctuation are statistically significant (ŷ≅y and dŷ/dx≅dy/dx) 
only every 8 quarters (4 phases, 2 years).  
Altman and Rijiken (2005) observe that agencies delay the timing of through the cycle rating 
migration estimates by 0.56 years at the downside and 0.79 years at the upside. This signifies that in 
Italy, with a phase period of 0.5 years, as we will see, in a period of economic downturn, agency 
ratings are systematically one phase late through the cycle.  
Jarrow et al. (1997) provide a discrete time-homogeneous Markov chain transition matrix for the 
term structure of credit risk spreads which assumes a time step of one year. In Italy in the period 2008-
2012 this time step corresponds to two phases of the cycle (1 year), rendering the assumption of time-
homogeneity during such time step not statistically acceptable.  
Gordy and Howells (2004) observe that credit risk adjusted portfolio management is based on time-
homogeneous Markov transition processes, which are based on ex-ante probabilities of default which 
register all expected variation in the rating variables and register all ex-post variation as unexpected. 
                                                
9 See BCBS 2010a, page 1 
10 MINEF, Documento di Economia e Finanza 2012, II: Documento di analisi e tendenze di finanza pubblica 
11 If a period is the duration of 1 cycle, the frequency is the number of cycles per period. The amplitude is the minima and 
maxima absolute values of the cycle. In our case: period=2 years, then frequency=1/2=0.5 cycles/year. In physical notation, 
to which we refer in this paper, a cycle has 4 phases: dy/dx>0 d2y/dx2>0, dy/dx>0 d2y/dx2<0, dy/dx<0 d2y/dx2<0, dy/dx<0 
d2y/dx2>0, 1 minimum dy/dx=0 d2y/dx2>0 and 1 maximum dy/dx=0 d2y/dx2<0. The phase period is equal to the cycle 
period/4. 
12 In a discrete distribution a maximum is determined when y(t)>y(t-1) and y(t)>y(t+1), a minimum when y(t)<y(t-1) and 
y(t)<y(t+1) and a steady state when y(t)=y(t-1) and/or y(t)=y(t+1). 
13 Italy Central Bank, Statistical Bulletin  III-2012, Information on Customer and Risk, Default Rates For Loan Facilities 
And Borrowers, TDB30486: Quarterly default rates for loan facilities - Distribution By Customer Sector Of Economic 
Activity And Total Credit Used: Non-financial Corporations - Reporting Institutions: Banks, Financial Companies And 
Other Institutions Reporting To The Ccr 
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Frequent cyclicality would systematically alter the ratio between unexpected and expected variation. 
Repullo et al. (2008, 2009, 2011) observe that higher buffers in expansions are insufficient to prevent a 
significant contraction in the supply of credit at the arrival of a recession, which in Italy has occurred 
in the period 2008-2012 every year.  
Sironi and Resti (2012) observe that a modification of the current IFRS 39 concept of incurred loss 
with a principle of fair value and amortized cost could further increase the procyclicality of banks’ 
credit policies. In Italy, 0.5-year phases render misleading through-the-cycle quarterly and half year 
estimates of fair values.  
2. Research Questions and Methods  
In this paper we have asked two research questions: 
 Q1 – is there a statistically significant linear relationship linking credit output fluctuations to default 
rates in the period June 2008 – June 2012? We argue that if such a linear relationship does exist or, in 
other words, if variation in credit supply is satisfactorily explained by independent variation in the 
default rates then, given the a priori postulate that exogenous macro-conditions, such as the business 
cycle, do affect default rates, and Basel II minimum capital requirements do have procyclical effects, 
then such exogenous effects are satisfactorily transformed by the relationship between credit and 
default rates, as it should be according to operating Basel II Accords; 
Q2 – given that Q1 linear relationship does exist, can we formulate a null hypothesis regarding the 
causes of such relationship which can be statistically analyzed and tested? In particular we will test the 
hypothesis that credit supply variation systematically converges towards a steady state, i.e. credit 
supply is systematically increased or decreased in order to achieve credit steady state at a definite level 
parameterized by a steady state parameter. 
We have analyzed Italy’s Central Bank Statistical Bulletin’s quarterly default rates for loan facilities 
(credit used) in the period March 1996 – June 2012: Information on customer and risk, default rates for 
loan facilities and borrowers (TDB30486); Quarterly default rates for loan facilities; Distribution by 
customer sector of economic activity and total credit used: Non-financial corporations; Reporting 
institutions: Banks, financial companies and other institutions reporting to the Central Credit Registrar.  
Coherently, we have defined: 
ABD = Adjusted bad debts refer to the total loan exposure of borrowers who, for the first time in the 
reference quarter, meet one of the total loans outstanding when a borrower is reported to the central credit 
register: a) as a bad debt by the only bank that disbursed credit; b) as a bad debt by one bank and as 
having an overshoot by the only other bank exposed; c) as a bad debt by one bank and the amount of the 
bad debt is at least 70% of its exposure towards the banking system or as having overshoots equal to or 
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more than 10% of its total loans outstanding; d) as a bad debt by at least two banks for amounts equal to 
or more than 10% of its total loans outstanding; 
TCU = the amount of total credit used by all the borrowers covered by the central credit register and not 
classified as adjusted bad debtors at the end of the previous quarter. The TCU does not include the credits 
that, in the given quarter, have been transferred to institutions not reporting to the central credit register; 
d = The default rate of loan facilities in a given quarter is represented by the ratio between the amount of 
total credit used by borrowers who become adjusted bad debtors (ABD) during the quarter in question and 
the amount of credit used by all the borrowers covered by the central credit register and not classified as 
adjusted bad debtors at the end of the previous quarter (TCU); 
L = Loans refer to loans disbursed by banks to non-banks calculated at face value (until September 2008 
at book value) gross of adjustment items and net of repayments. The aggregate includes mortgage loans, 
current account overdrafts, loans secured by pledge of salaries, credit card advances, discounting of 
annuities, personal loans, leasing (from December 2008 according to the ias17 definition), factoring, other 
financial investments (e.g. commercial paper, bill portfolio, pledge loans, loans granted from funds 
administered for third parties), bad debts and unpaid and protested own bills. the aggregate is net of 
repurchase agreements and, since December 2008, net of stock exchange repos and gross of 
correspondent current accounts. performing loans. 
We have analyzed data with a simplified Bayesian biostatistical technique called “Retrospective 
Forecasting” utilized by Shaman and Karspeck (2012a , 2012b) to predict flu epidemics in New York 
City on the basis of fluctuating outcomes. The technique assumes retrospectively perfect knowledge of 
future parameters and the posterior parameters and other state variables are reset to an initial 
distribution before commencing each reiterative forecast form the present into the past (Backward 
Calculation)14 which, as we will see, will determine, in our case, the Internal Steady State Parameter Ϛ 
(little sigma) of the system.  
An epidemic reaches a steady state when: 
	  
HI :1= 1+ f0 ,1( ) 1− d0 ,1( )+ 1+ f1,2( ) 1− d1,2( )1+ς + ...+ 1+ fn−1,n( ) 1− dn−1,n( )1+ς( )n
s =
1
1+ς
1= 1+ f0 ,1( ) 1− d0 ,1( )+ 1+ f1,2( ) 1− d1,2( )s + ...+ 1+ fn−1,n( ) 1− dn−1,n( )sn
ς = 1 s( )−1= 0
. 
where we have defined the variable f as: 
                                                
14 See also Backward Calculation in Eurostat (2003); 3.2 
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f  = The credit growth rate determined as 
 	  ft ,t+1  Lt+δ ,t+1TCUt+δ 1− dt+δ ,t+1( )
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
δ→0+
 . 
The credit growth rate is asymptotically equal to the amount of loan facilities disbursed in period t,t+n 
divided by the total credit used at the beginning t of the period which will survive (1-d) to the end t+n of 
such period. The variable f assumes that the credit risk manager possesses perfect information regarding d 
and therefore will not grant new loans or additional loans L to borrowers which he knows will default in 
the same period; 
δ = The sliding time parameter δ accounts for the fact that the nearer the credit risk manager gets 
retrospectively to time t+n , the more perfect information becomes and thus the retrospective forecast. In 
the quarterly data analyzed we have assumed δ=0, i.e. the credit risk manager has at time t perfect 
information regarding default rates and credit growth rates regarding the period t,t+n. 
We have assumed an LGD=1; the hypothesis is reasonable in the framework of the analysis since 
recovery rates affect, at time of recovery, the credit supply to the economy, and such effect will be 
“seen” in the total credit used and in the credit growth rate. 
We can now formulate the null hypotheses that: 
Q1: 	  HQ10 : ft ,t+n = β1 + β2dt ,t+n + εt ,t+nβ2 < 0 : credit supply growth is a dependent variable explained by a 
negative linear relationship with the independent default rate; 
Q2:  	  HQ20 : f = d1− d  : credit supply growth or decline rate is explained by odds of default, i.e. the ratio 
between the default rate and the survival rate. In alternative, we will test the hypothesis that credit 
supply growth or decline rate is not explained by the odds of default alone and is sensitive to 
exogenous cyclical positive or negative factors, which we will define as the Steady State Parameter Ϛ 
of the system. There follows that 	  HQ2I : f = d +ς1− d  
We have utilized Mathematica 8 and Statistical-Graphical Integration with Mac OS X Datagraph 3.1. 
3. Findings 
We have divided the Credit Supply Growth Rates (f) and the Default Rates (d) of the period March 
1996 – June 2012 into 2 sub-periods. The first period from March 1996 to June 2008 excluded, and the 
second period from June 2008 included to June 2012.  
Linear regression of credit supply rates on default rates by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) from 
March 1996 to June 2008  (n=49) reveals a not significant r=.20817; R2 =.043336 and s for 
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residual=.024809. Steady state null hypotheses H0  and HI  testing of the observed credit growth rates vs. 
the expected rates reveals a steady state parameter of Ϛ=.020584 (2.1%) with a s for residual=.024976 
and 𝛘2= 106.66 with v=48 (Exhibit 1 – Functions not shown). 
 Linear regression of credit supply rates on default rates by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) from June 
2008 to June 2012 (n=17) reveals a r=−.69032; R2 =.47654 and s for residual=.0087185. Steady state 
null hypotheses H0  and HI  testing of the observed credit growth rates vs. the expected rates reveals a 
steady state parameter of Ϛ=.00245 (0.2%) with a s for residual=.013152 and 𝛘2= 37.47 (v=16, P<.005) 
(Exhibit 1). 
In synthesis, from June 2008 to June 2012 (n=17), we accept the hypothesis that credit growth rates 
are negatively correlated to default rates but appear to be significantly fluctuating around the Steady State 
Function. 
The heuristic path of adjustment of credit growth rate in the period June 2008-June 2012 to the 
Steady State Function Ϛ=.00245 is shown in Exhibit 2 
Exhibit 1 
 
Sources:  
Banca d’Italia TDB30486, ISTAT, Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze 
Statistics:  
Mathematica 8 and Mac OS X Datagraph 3.1 
 
Credit Supply Growth Rates Mar96-Jun08 vs Default Rates Mar96-Jun08
Credit Supply Growth rates Jun08-Jun12 vs Default Rates Jun08-Jun12
Fit of Credit Supply Growth rates Jun08-Jun12 vs Default Rates Jun08-Jun12
Fit of Default Rates Jun08-Jun12 vs Default Rates Jun08-Jun12
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Exhibit 2: Credit Supply Growth Rate fluctuations around the exogenous Steady State 
Parameter Ϛ in the period June 2008 – June 2012
 
 
Sources:  
Banca d’Italia TDB30486, ISTAT, Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze 
Legenda: 
Solid line: Steady State Parameter SSE 
Circles: [June 2008 – June 2012] 
Hollows: [March 1996 – June 2008) 
Arrows Blue: Credit Supply Growth Rate - dy/dt>0  
Arrows Red: Credit Supply Growth Rate - dy/dt<0  
Statistics:  
Mac OS X Omnigraph Pro v22.29 
 
Exhibit 3: Parameters of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Linear Regression and Steady State 
Function (SSF) 
 
 [March 1996 – June 2008)  [June 2008 – March 2012] 
 OLS  SSF  OLS  SSF 
        
N 49  49  17  17 
        
Ϛ   0.020584    0.00245 
        
Intercept 0.0144    0.040187   
σ Intercept 0.0086    0.0092139   
X Intercept -0.0063    0.0072893   
        
Slope 2.2931    -5.5131   
σ Slope 1.6061    1.5443   
        
Correlation 0.20817    -0.69032   
R2 0.04334    0.47654   
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σ 0.024549  0.024715  0.0084582  0.01276 
s for residual 0.024809  0.024976  0.0087185  0.013152 
        
𝛘2   106.66    37.47 
 
Sources: Banca d’Italia TDB30486, ISTAT, Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze 
Statistics: Mac OS X Datagraph 3.1 and Mathematica 8.0 
 
4. Interpretation 
Credit risk management in Italy is characterized, in the period June 2008 – June 2012, by frequent 
(frequency=0.5 cycles/year) and intense (peak amplitude: mean=39.2 b€; s.e.=2.83 b€) quarterly 
contractions and expansions around the mean (915.4 b€; s.e.=3.59 b€) of the nominal total credit used 
by non-financial corporations. Such frequent and intense fluctuations are frequently ascribed to 
exogenous Basel II procyclical effects on credit flow into the economy and, consequently, Basel III 
output-based point-in-time Credit/GDP countercyclical buffering advocated. We have tested the 
opposite null hypotheses that such variation is significantly correlated to actual default rates, and that 
such correlation is explained by fluctuations of credit supply around a steady state. We have found 
that, in the period June 2008 – June 2012 (n=17), linear regression of credit growth rates on default 
rates reveals a negative correlation of r=−.6903 with R2=.4765, and that credit supply fluctuates 
steadily around the default rate with a Steady State Parameter SSP=.00245 with 𝛘2=37.47 (v=16, 
P<.005). We conclude that fluctuations of the total credit used by non-financial corporations are 
exhaustively explained by variation of the independent variable “default rate”, and that credit variation 
fluctuates around a steady state. We conclude that credit risk management in Italy has been effective in 
parameterizing credit supply variation to default rates within the Basel II operating framework. Basel 
III prospective countercyclical point-in-time output buffers based on filtered Credit/GDP ratios and 
dynamic provisioning proposals should take into account this underlying steady state statistical pattern.  
5. Limits 
As Gordy (2003) observes credit risk is idiosyncratic to the obligor, and what we define a cycle is 
really a composite of a multiplicity of cycles tied to location, period and sector. Therefore this model 
suffers form the same limits as the Credit/GDP countercyclical buffers, i.e. a single-factor model 
cannot capture any clustering of default rates due to dishomogeneous sensitivity to smaller-scale 
components of the macro cycle.  
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